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This study presents descriptive and causal evidence on the role of the social en-
vironment in shaping the accuracy of self-assessment. We introduce a novel in-
centivized measurement tool to measure the accuracy of self-assessment among
children and use this tool to show that children from high socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES) families are more accurate in their self-assessment, compared to
children from low SES families. To move beyond correlational evidence, we
then exploit the exogenous variation of participation in a mentoring program
designed to enrich the social environment of children. We document that the
mentoring program has a causal positive effect on the accuracy of children’s
self-assessment. Finally, we show that the mentoring program is most effec-
tive for children whose parents provide few social and interactive activities for
their children.
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1 Introduction
Many decisions of economic relevance entail an element of self-assessment of one’s
abilities. Should I go to college or pursue an apprenticeship? Should I choose a
more or less challenging career path? Should I open a restaurant or not? All these
decisions require prior reflection of own abilities, strengths, and weaknesses, and
more accurate self-assessments will, on average, yield better decisions. Intuitively,
achieving an accurate self-assessment can be challenging. The development of a
sense of one’s strengths and weaknesses naturally depends on the feedback one
obtains. Learning opportunities may be scarce and their frequency likely depends
on the social environment in which people grow up and live in. To fix ideas, think
of two otherwise identical individuals, Marta and Jessica. While Marta grew up
in an environment where abundant feedback was provided, Jessica grew up in an
environment where feedback was rare. It is conceivable that Marta developed a
clearer sense of herself and a greater ability to judge her own skills, strengths, and
weaknesses, compared to Jessica. Despite their intuitive importance, little is known
about the social determinants of accurate self-assessments.
In this paper, we seek to elucidate the role of the social environment for the devel-
opment of accurate self-assessments. Making progress on this question is challenging
for two reasons. First, to establish causality in the relationship between social envi-
ronment and self-assessment, one would ideally like to observe exogenous changes in
the social environment. However, such changes are rare in naturally occurring data.
Second, measuring the accuracy of self-assessment is difficult, because many aspects
of people’s decision problems are unknown to the researcher. We circumvent these
challenges by making use of a combination of field and lab-in-the-field experimental
evidence.
We focus on children in elementary school, arguably an important time of devel-
opment where many skills and abilities are formed (see, e.g., Roberts and DelVec-
chio, 2000; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Falk et al., forthcoming). It is also a crit-
ical time for the development of metacognitive capacities (see, e.g., Veenman, Van
Hout-Wolters, and Afflerbach, 2006; Veenman and Spaans, 2005; Perry, Lundie, and
Golder, 2019). Hence, the feedback provided from the social environment during
that period might be a crucial input into the development of self-assessment abil-
ities. In the first step, we exploit naturally occurring variation in children’s social
environments as captured by the socioeconomic status (SES) of their parents. SES
reflects the “social standing” of individuals or families in society and can be sum-
marized as the level of economic, educational, and time resources available at the
1
household level. It is conceivable that high-SES parents can provide their children
with a richer social environment, consisting of more frequent and more diverse oppor-
tunities to obtain feedback and learn about their skills and abilities. In the second
step, we then seek to establish causality in the role of the social environment. For
that purpose, we exploit an exogenous enhancement of the social environment for a
randomly determined subgroup of low-SES children via an existing social program
in Germany (see Kosse et al. (2020)). In the program, children are provided with a
mentor for around one year to enrich their social environment. The mentors intro-
duce the children to new activities and generate new experiences and feedback for
them.
After the completion of the mentoring program, we conducted controlled exper-
iments and interviews with the children and parents of the treated and non-treated
low SES groups, as well as the high-SES group. Our main goal was to obtain a
measure of the accuracy of children’s self-assessment. This was challenging for two
reasons: the measure should (i) reflect the accuracy of self-assessment in an incen-
tivized way, and (ii) be intuitive and easy to comprehend for children that age. We
developed a tailored experimental game that, as we argue, meets both criteria. The
experimental task was to hit a small hole with a marble and, after experiencing the
basic task in a practice round, the key decision problem was to select a level of dif-
ficulty (the size of the hole). The trade-off we implemented is that higher difficulty
levels yielded a higher reward, but at the same time came with a greater risk of not
mastering the task, in which case the reward was zero. The key idea underlying
the design of the game is that ceteris paribus, more accurate judgments of own skill
levels allow children to achieve higher earnings in expectation, through the choice
of more appropriate difficulty levels. Hence, controlling for other factors, rewards in
the task serve as a measure of the accuracy of self-assessment. At the same time,
the game is simple to understand and intuitive for children at that age.
Our first result is that children from families with high SES demonstrated more
accurate self-assessments (as measured by higher earnings in the self-assessment
game) compared to children from families with low SES. We then establish causal-
ity in the relationship between social environment and accurate self-assessments by
exploiting the random variation in whether low-SES children participated in the
mentoring program. Our second and main result is that the enhanced social en-
vironment substantially and significantly improves the accuracy of self-assessment.
Both results are robust to using different empirical specifications and controlling for
selective attrition, ability, as well as risk preferences. Taken together, these find-
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ings highlight the importance of the social environment as a causal determinant of
accurate self-assessment.
We proceed by delving into the underlying mechanisms of our key result. Specif-
ically, we seek to understand which environmental factors are missing in low-SES
families that affect accurate self-assessments. Intuitively, feedback and experiences
are prime candidates. This intuition is bolstered by the literature on the develop-
ment of metacognition, which emphasizes that feedback and learning opportunities
are crucial inputs for the development of metacognition (Flavell, 1979). To make
progress, we look at self-reports obtained from parents about the nature of the so-
cial environment they provide to their children. We proxy the opportunities to learn
about oneself provided by the social environment by looking at the number of highly
interactive activities undertaken by the children. We find that these activities are
correlated with the accuracy of self-assessment as measured by our paradigm and we
find that the effect of participation in the mentoring program is more pronounced
for children whose parents provided few highly interactive activities. These results
suggest that highly interactive activities and the associated richness of feedback are
a key aspect of the social environment that determines accurate self-assessment. It
also appears to be an aspect that is missing in low-SES environments. Crucially, the
mentoring program appears to fill this gap and thereby improves the belief accuracy
of low-SES children.
It is well-documented that children from families with high and low SES differ in
important life outcomes, such as educational attainment and labor market success
(e.g. Bradley and Corwyn, 2002; Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues, 2011; Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006). Prevalent explanations for differences in educational
or labor market attainment largely focus on differences in children’s cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, such as IQ, persistence, and patience (see e.g. Duckworth et al.,
2007; Golsteyn, Grönqvist, and Lindahl, 2014; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008;
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001; Schmidt and Hunter, 2004). Our paper relates to this
literature and reveals that SES predicts the ability to assess one’s strengths and
weaknesses, arguably a key determinant of the quality of economic decision-making.
More specifically, the findings from this paper relate to an active literature that
analyzes the causal effect of the social environment on skills and preferences (e.g.
Alan, Boneva, and Ertac, 2019; Cappelen et al., forthcoming; Kosse et al., 2020).
Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the self-assessment of skills.
In other words, while existing work has highlighted the crucial role of a broad set
of social and environmental factors for the development of both cognitive and non-
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cognitive skills, our work sheds light on the role of the social environment for the
ability to self-assess these skills.1
In the next section, we present details about the study design and our main
outcome variables. Section 3 summarizes our findings and Section 4 concludes.
2 Study Design and Data
2.1 Recruitment and Randomization
Figure A1 in Appendix A presents a flow chart of the timing, sampling, and procedu-
ral details of the study (see also Kosse et al. (2020) for further details). Recruitment
started in the summer of 2011. We used official registry data to obtain the addresses
of families (with children aged from seven to nine) living in the German cities of
Bonn and Cologne. Families were contacted via postal mail and informed about the
possibility to take part in the mentoring program and the interviews. We informed
parents that participation in the mentoring program was not guaranteed due to
limited capacity. The interested families were asked to fill out and return a short
questionnaire concerning the socioeconomic characteristics of the household and to
sign a non-binding letter of intent to take part in the interviews and the mentoring
program. We received 1,626 complete responses and, based on the questionnaire,
we categorized respondents as either high or low-SES households.2
All low-SES families that expressed interest were invited to take part in the
study. To take part, families had to participate in a baseline wave of interviews (fall
2011) and provide written consent to allow the transmission of their addresses to the
mentoring program. Importantly, the mentoring program could only accommodate
1As such, our findings also relate to the literature that studies beliefs about own skills and
abilities in the lab (e.g. Eil and Rao, 2011; Möbius et al., 2013; Zimmermann, 2020) and in the field
(e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Huffman, Raymond, and Shvets, 2019). A common finding
in this literature is that people on average tend to be overconfident, although people sometimes also
appear underconfident. Moore and Healy (2008) provide evidence that the incidence of over- and
underconfidence crucially depends on task difficulty. Importantly, thus far this literature has not
considered the long-run effects of the social environment on the development of beliefs about own
skills and abilities. The developmental psychology literature has focused on notions of self-esteem
and self-confidence and their development in children and adolescents (e.g. Twenge and Campell,
2001; Wigfield et al., 1991). Apart from the focus on different outcome measures, this literature
does not study the causal role of the social environment on these outcomes.
2SES reflects the level of resources available at the household level, i.e., material, educational,
and time resources. Accordingly, a household was classified as low SES if at least one of the three
following criteria was met (see Kosse et al. (2020) for further details): (i) Low income: Equivalence
income of the household is lower than 1,065 Euro. This corresponds to the 30% quantile of the
German income distribution. (ii) Low education: Neither the mother nor the father of the child
has a school-leaving degree qualifying for university studies. (iii) Single-parent status: A parent is
classified as a single parent if he/she is not living together with a partner.
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212 families; hence, out of 590 low-SES families who participated in the baseline
wave and gave consent, 212 were randomly selected and constitute our treatment
group (Treatment Low SES). The remaining 378 families form the control group
(Control Low SES).3
Notice that the actual assignment of mentors to children in Treatment Low SES
was conducted by the mentoring program. Each child in the treatment group could
potentially be matched, but not all selected children were matched in the end. A
mentor-mentee match was successfully implemented for 74% of the 212 children.
For the remaining 26%, matches could not be realized due to a local shortage of
mentors, mentor refusals, or coordination problems between mentors and families
(e.g., pregnancy of the mentor or moving of mentor or family). In the analysis, we
hence focus on intent-to-treat effects (ITT) between Treatment and Control Low
SES.
We also invited 150 randomly-chosen high-SES families to take part in the study
(not the mentoring program). 122 took part in the baseline wave of interviews and
serve as an additional benchmark group (Control High SES).
After the one-year mentoring program, all families that participated in the base-
line wave (Treatment Low SES, Control Low SES, and Control High SES) were in-
vited to take part in the post-treatment interviews and experiments (post-treatment
wave) in which all of our main outcome variables were elicited.4
2.2 The Mentoring Program
We exogenously enhanced the social environment of the treated low-SES families
with the help of an existing and well-established non-profit mentoring program in
Germany, “Balu und Du”.5 In this program, elementary school children are provided
with a mentor for up to one year. The mentors are predominantly university students
(aged from 18 to 30) who volunteer to serve as a mentor for a child.
The mentoring program is not targeted toward specific learning goals (such as
improved school grades), but rather to enriching children’s everyday lives. A key
component of the program is to introduce children to new activities, enable new
experiences, and provide feedback; possibly exactly the inputs that are needed for
3Randomization was stratified by city (Cologne or Bonn) and SES criteria, for a total of 14
strata. Given the larger relative supply of mentors in Bonn, we assigned a higher share of children
in Bonn to the treatment group. Thus, the assignment into treatment was random conditional on
location. Therefore, we condition on location for the analyses.
485.3% of the families took part in this second wave of interviews and experiments. See section
3.4 for a discussion of sample balance and attrition.
5More details about the mentoring program can be found on www.balu-und-du.de.
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them to develop an accurate sense of their abilities and that might be missing in low-
SES families. In practical terms, a mentor typically spends one afternoon per week
in one-to-one interactions with his/her mentee. During this time, they engage in
joint activities such as cooking, sports, handicraft work, or visiting a zoo, museum,
or playground.
To date, “Balu und Du” has arranged and supervised around 10,000 mentor-child
relationships in more than 50 different locations in Germany. The mentoring pro-
gram is embedded in a tightly organized structure. Every week, mentors complete
an online report in which they document their activities and potential problems that
came up in their relationship with the child. Program coordinators offer support
whenever necessary and provide coaching and advice to mentors. They also orga-
nize bi-weekly monitoring meetings in which mentors receive suggestions for new
activities and can discuss potential problems.
The mentoring program is designed to last up to 12 months. In our sample,
the average duration of mentor-mentee relationships was 9.3 months. Variation in
duration is mainly due to unforeseeable events such as moving decisions of parents
or mentors due to a job change. On average, treated children met their mentor 22.8
times (std. dev. 11.9), typically for an entire afternoon (amounting to an average
total of around 92 hours).
2.3 Setting of Experiments and Procedures
In both waves of the experiment, the child was accompanied by one parent. In
95% of the cases, the interviewed parent was the biological mother. Therefore, for
convenience, we use the term “mother” for the adult who was interviewed. The
interviews took place at central locations in Bonn and Cologne. The interviews and
experiments were conducted according to a detailed protocol. The interviews lasted
about one hour and, for participation in the interview, mothers received 35 Euros
at baseline and 45 Euros in the post-treatment wave.
The children participated in several experiments and intelligence tests and an-
swered a brief questionnaire. The experiments were incentivized using toys. We
introduced an experimental currency called “stars”. At the end of the interview,
children could exchange their stars for toys. Toys were arranged in four categories
that increased in objective value and subjective attractiveness to children. Children
were told that more stars would result in the option of choosing toys from a higher
category.6
6We ensured that each additional star that would not result in a higher category was nevertheless
valuable: these stars were exchanged into “Lego” bricks.
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We took great care to create a pleasant interview situation. The mother and
the child were seated in the same room but were not allowed to communicate.
To avoid interaction between the two, a standardized seating plan was used so
that the mother and child could not directly see each other. One experimenter
ran experiments with only one child at a time. During the experiments, mothers
completed a comprehensive survey covering topics such as basic information about
the child, assessments of personality and attitudes of the child, the socioeconomic
background of the family, details on how the parent(s) spend time with the child
including joint activities, as well as economic preferences, personality, and attitudes
of the mother.
Several measures were implemented to mitigate potential concerns related to
biased reporting and experimenter demand effects (DeQuidt, Haushofer, and Roth
(2018)): (i) mentors received no information about the elicited measures, to avoid
any form of “training to the test”; (ii) interviewers were not informed about the
purpose of the study or the treatment assignment of the participating families; (iii)
the intervention was not mentioned during the data collection phase, and (iv) the
research team never interacted directly with the children or their parents.
2.4 Main Variables
In the following, we summarize the key outcome measures used for this study.7
Accuracy of Self-Assessments: We designed an experimental paradigm with
two main goals in mind. The paradigm should (i) provide a measure that reflects
the accuracy of self-assessments and (ii) be intuitive and easy to comprehend for
children of age eight or nine. The latter goal, in particular, posed a challenge.
Arguably, the abstract state of the art belief elicitation paradigms that pervade
modern experimental economics are unsuitable for children of that age. Hence, we
opted for the following more intuitive paradigm.
The basic experimental task was to hit a small hole with a marble (see figure A2
in Appendix A). The children could first experience the task in a practice round
(10 trials). This allowed them to become acquainted with the task. In addition, it
served as an individual-level “marble lane ability” measure which we use as a control
variable in the analysis.
After, the practice round, the key decision problem we implemented was that
children had to select a level of difficulty (the size of the hole). The basic trade-off
7Kosse et al. (2020) summarize additional measures unrelated to this paper, such as measures
of pro-sociality.
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we implemented was that higher difficulty levels yielded a higher reward, but at
the same time came with a greater risk of not mastering the task, in which case
the reward was zero. Specifically, the difficulty levels were varied via the size of
the hole (21, 18, 15, 12, 9, 6, or 3 cm diameter) that needed to be hit with the
marble to score. Hitting fewer than five times in ten attempts resulted in zero
earnings. Scoring at least five times in ten attempts on the chosen marble lane
resulted in positive earnings, and earnings linearly increased with the difficulty of
the chosen lane. For scoring at least five times on the easiest marble lane, a child
earned one unit of the experimental currency; for scoring at least five times on the
most difficult marble lane, a child earned seven units of the experimental currency.
The key idea underlying the design of the game was that, ceteris paribus, more
accurate self-assessment of skill levels allow children to obtain higher rewards, in
expectation, due to more appropriate lane choices. At the same time, the game
is simple to understand and intuitive for children at that age. Hence, controlling
for other factors, the rewards in the task serve as a measure of the accuracy of
self-assessment.
The downside of implementing our more intuitive paradigm is that other factors,
namely ability in the marble game as well as risk preferences, potentially might play
a role and, jointly with the accuracy of self-assessments, determine rewards in the
task. Therefore, we make extensive use of our ability measure and our measure of risk
preferences (see below) to account for their potential roles in various specifications.
Section 3.4 summarizes how ability and risk preferences could affect earnings in the
task and how we address this empirically.
The measure was elicited in the post-treatment wave. Before the start of the
game, the experimenter asked several control questions to carefully check the child’s
understanding of the game and, if necessary, explained the rules again.8 Appendix
B contains a translated version of the exact wording of the instructions given to
experimenters and children.
Risk preferences: Similar to our belief measure, measuring risk preferences among
children poses a challenge. While one would ideally want to implement standard
price lists or BDM mechanisms, one needs to ensure that children intuitively under-
stand the risk-return trade-off. With this in mind, we implemented the following
risk elicitation task (see Falk et al. (forthcoming)). We measured children’s risk
attitudes in the post-treatment wave by presenting two coins to children (situation
8We excluded 11 observations from the analysis (about 2% of observations for each of the three
groups, Control High SES, Control Low SES, Treatment Low SES) because these children did
not completely understand the rules of the game even after three repeated explanations by the
interviewer.
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A): one with three stars printed on each side, the other with seven stars on one
side and zero on the other. The children had to choose which coin would be tossed.
The safe value of three was also “determined” by a coin toss to ensure that children
do not prefer the risky option for its higher entertainment value. After children
made their decision, but before actually tossing the chosen coin, the experimenter
presented two additional coins in another color (situation B): one with four stars on
each side, the other, as before, with seven stars on one side and zero on the other.
Again, children had to choose which coin would be tossed and the interviewer then
tossed the two chosen coins. The order in which the two variations of the game
(situation A and situation B) were played was randomized. In the analyses, we use
the number of risky choices to control for risk preferences.
Social interaction patterns: The main goal here was to understand which as-
pects that are being offered by the mentoring program might be missing in low-SES
environments. The literature suggests that feedback and learning opportunities are
important inputs for the development of metacognitive capacities (Flavell, 1979).
To make progress, we asked mothers in structured interviews at baseline how
they spend time with their child. We focused on activities that might be missing in
low-SES families and that typically entail learning opportunities and feedback. We
also focused on activities that we knew are typically part of the mentoring program.
Such activities include having a conversation, playing board or card games, having a
snack together, playing music together, or going to music lessons. For each activity,
the precise wording of the question was: “How many times during the last 14 days
have you or the main caregiver done the following activities together with your
child?”. We created a variable for “intensity of social interactions” as the average
share of highly interactive activities.9
3 Results
3.1 Preliminaries and Data Description
Recall that after the one-year treatment period, all families who had participated
at baseline were invited to take part in the post-treatment wave. 85.3% (607 out of
712) took part in this second wave of interviews. 596 answered the control questions
correctly and constitute our core sample.
Our main treatment comparison is between Treatment Low SES and Control Low
SES. Columns 1 and 2 in table 1 reveal no detectable sample imbalance between
9For further details on this measure, see also Kosse et al. (2020).
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the two treatments, neither before (column 1) nor after the intervention (column
2). Columns 3 and 4 indicate no evidence for selective attrition. Attrition is not
significantly related to treatment status, performance at baseline, the intensity of
interaction at baseline, nor to the respective interactions. Nevertheless, we also in-
clude inverse probability weighting methods (IPW) to adapt for minor imbalances
as a robustness check. We estimated the weights from a linear probability model of
a binary selection indicator (indicating whether the self-assessment measure is avail-
able for the post-treatment wave), regressed on baseline measures of self-assessment,
social interaction and ability, treatment and high-SES dummies, and the interaction
of the baseline measures and the group dummies.
Sample: Low SES T & C Assigned to Lost to
treatment follow-up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gained stars (baseline, standardized) 0.008 0.003 -0.005
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Intense interaction (baseline, std.) -0.000 -0.006 -0.012
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Treatment dummy -0.013 -0.012
(0.033) (0.033)
Gained stars x Treatment dummy 0.015
(0.033)
Intense interaction x Treat. dummy 0.017
(0.033)
Sample restriction No Wave 2 No No
Observations 590 485 590 590
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
p-value F-test (all indep. vars. = 0) 0.925 0.956 0.699 0.977
Table 1: Analyses of treatment assignment and attrition. Coefficients are OLS estimates, standard
errors in brackets.***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Figure 1 displays histograms for chosen lane difficulty and earnings over all three
groups of children (Control Low SES, Treatment Low SES, Control High SES). On
average, children chose a lane difficulty of 4.74 (standard deviation: 1.22) and 24%
of children failed the task for the chosen difficulty level. Average earnings from the
self-assessment task were 3.30 (standard deviation: 2.08) units of the experimental
currency (“stars”). For earnings, figure 1 reveals substantial left-censoring. Hence,
we estimate a Tobit model (lower limit at zero). For robustness, we also provide
OLS and Poisson (count data) estimates in Appendix A.
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We focused on children in elementary school because the literature suggests that
this might be the time in which abilities to accurately judge one’s own strengths
and weaknesses are formed. Table A1 in the Appendix corroborates this view and
shows positive correlation between the accuracy of self-assessments and the age
of the children. This pattern holds irrespective of controlling for ability and risk
preferences.
Figure 1: Histograms for chosen lane difficulty and earnings over all three treatment conditions.
3.2 Socioeconomic Status and Self-Assessment
We begin our analysis of the role of the social environment for the accuracy of
self-assessments (measured post-treatment) by comparing children from a low-SES
background to children with a high-SES background. While we do not claim causal-
ity for this comparison, we nevertheless view it as a useful benchmark exercise that
allows us to document the extent to which the accuracy of self-assessment is associ-
ated with the social environment in which children grow up.
In all main regressions, we condition on ability fixed effects (FEs), interviewer
FEs, location, gender, and age. As discussed above, given the nature of our data
we report Tobit estimates. Table 2 displays the results of regressing earnings in
the self-assessment game on an SES dummy (High SES versus Low SES Control).
The results indicate that SES is significantly associated with earnings in the self-
assessment game. In column 1, without using further controls, we show that children
from high-SES families earn, on average, more than an additional half of a star. In
columns 2 and 3 we check for robustness and show that the gap is largely unaffected
by systematic attrition (column 2) and heterogeneities in risk preferences (column
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3).10 The gap is sizable and corresponds to about 25% to 30% of a standard deviation
and to about 15% to 20% of average earnings.
Sample: low & high SES Control Gained stars (# 0-7)
(1) (2) (3)
Base: low SES Control
High SES dummy 0.612* 0.624** 0.511*
(0.327) (0.304) (0.302)
Inverse probability weighting no yes yes
Controlling for risk pref. no no yes
Observations 420 420 420
Table 2: Coefficients are Tobit estimates, standard errors in brackets. All regressions also include
a constant, age, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling), interviewer FEs and marble ability
FEs. Marble ability is the performance in the trial round. Willingness to take risk is the number
of risky choices (lottery over save amount). IPWs account for potential selective attrition and are
estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection indicator (indicating whether the
self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave) regressed on baseline measures of
self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and high SES dummies and the interaction
of baseline measures and the group dummies. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
3.3 The Mentoring Program and Self-Assessment
We now move to our main analysis and shed some light on the causal role of the
social environment. For this purpose, we exploit the randomization of low-SES
children into the mentoring program. To do so, we follow the same estimation
approach as before and regress earnings in the self-assessment game from the post-
treatment wave on a treatment dummy (low-SES treatment versus low-SES control).
In all main regressions, we again condition on ability FEs, interviewer FEs, location,
gender, and age.
The results shown in table 3 (column 1) show a pronounced and significant
positive causal effect of the enrichment of the social environment on the accuracy of
self-assessment. The enrichment of the social environment through the mentoring
program increased children’s earnings in the self-assessment task by more than 0.5
stars. There is no evidence that the treatment effect is biased by selective attrition
(column 2) or the effects of risk preferences (column 3). Relating these effects to
the SES gap documented in table 2, it seems that the mentoring program has the
10The slight decrease in effect size in column 3 relates to a small high-to-low SES gap in risk
preferences, see e.g. Falk et al. (forthcoming).
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potential to close this gap.11 These results are robust to various changes in the
specification. In table A2, we show estimates of similar size and significance for
estimations without control variables. In tables A3 and A4, we confirm these results
by estimating Poisson and OLS regressions.
Sample: Low SES T & C Gained stars (# 0-7)
(1) (2) (3)
Base: Low SES Control
Treatment dummy 0.650** 0.639** 0.621**
(0.283) (0.284) (0.279)
Inverse probability weighting no yes yes
Controlling for risk pref. no no yes
Observations 485 485 485
Table 3: Coefficients are Tobit estimates, standard errors in brackets. All regressions also include
a constant, age, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling), interviewer FEs and marble ability
FEs. Marble ability is the performance in the trial round. Willingness to take risk is the number
of risky choices (lottery over save amount). IPWs account for potential selective attrition and are
estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection indicator (indicating whether the
self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave) regressed on baseline measures of
self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and high SES dummies and the interaction
of baseline measures and the group dummies. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
To shed light on the underlying choice pattern generated by the mentoring pro-
gram, table 4 analyses children’s lane choice and their failure rate. To this end, the
table shows OLS coefficients of regressing the chosen difficulty level and the failure
probability on high-SES and treatment dummies. Column (1) shows that untreated
low-SES children selected more difficult lanes compared to treated-low SES children
and high-SES children. Consequently, these children failed more frequently (see col-
umn (2) of table 4) which (as we saw in tables 2 and 3) leads to lower earnings on
average.
11Using the full sample, including dummies for control high SES and treatment low SES (i.e., us-
ing control low SES as the base) and testing for equality of the treatment and high-SES coefficients,
yields p-values greater than 0.6 for all specifications.
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Sample: Low SES T & C Chosen lane (# 1-7) Failure (0/1)
(1) (2)
Base: Low SES Control
Treatment dummy -0.310*** -0.121***
(0.113) (0.042)
High SES dummy -0.457*** -0.111**
(0.121) (0.046)
Observations 594 596
Table 4: Coefficients are inverse probability weighted (IPW) OLS estimates, standard errors in
brackets. All regressions also include a constant, age, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling),
interviewer FEs, marble ability FEs and standardized willingness to take risk. IPWs account for
potential selective attrition and are estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection
indicator (indicating whether the self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave)
regressed on baseline measures of self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and
high SES dummies and the interaction of baseline measures and the group dummies. The are two
missings in our dataset for the chosen lane difficulty, due to experimenter misreporting. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.4 Discussion: Ability and Risk Preferences
Next, we discuss the role of ability and risk preferences in more detail. As em-
phasized earlier, both ability and risk preferences potentially affect our outcome
measure. The main concern with ability is that it obviously relates to rewards in
the game and that it might also be affected by the intervention. To address this
concern, table A5 in the Appendix verifies that we do not detect any differences in
marble ability between low-SES treatment and low-SES control. Moreover, Tables
3, A2, A3, and A4 indicate that our results are robust to including ability FEs in
various specifications.
The concern with risk preferences might be less obvious, but risk preferences
can affect lane choice because children may opt for a “safer” lane and thereby be
willing to forego expected earnings. In addition, risk preferences might also be
affected by the treatment. To address the role of risk preferences, similar to ability,
table A5 in the Appendix verifies that we do not detect any differences in risk
preferences between low-SES treatment and low-SES control. Furthermore, Tables 3,
A3, and A4 show robustness when we include controls for risk preferences. Table A6
estimates the treatment effect separately for different risk groups (no risky choices
versus at least one risky choice). We obtain similar and statistically significant
treatment effects for both subsamples.
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Taken together, we find no evidence that ability or risk preferences drive our
results or change the interpretation of our findings in any meaningful way.
3.5 Heterogeneous treatment effects
We proceed by delving into the underlying mechanisms of our treatment effect.
Specifically, we seek to shed light on the environmental factors that appear to be
missing in low-SES families that influence accurate self-assessment. We take our
measure of social interaction patterns as a proxy for the opportunities to learn
about oneself that the social environment provides.
Following the estimation approach as before, column 1 of table 5 reveals that
for control low SES children, there is a pronounced positive relationship between
the self-reported intensity of social interactions and the accuracy of self-assessment.
Crucially, if the intensity of social interactions is a critical element in the relation-
ship between social environment and the accuracy of self-assessment, and if this is
the input that the mentoring program delivers, then we should see that the effect
of the mentoring program is more pronounced for families with fewer intense social
interactions. Table 5 column 2 shows this to be the case for our sample. We regress
earnings in the self-assessment game on our measure of the intensity of social in-
teractions (measured at baseline), a treatment dummy, and an interaction term of
treatment status and intensity of social interactions. The results indicate a signif-
icant negative interaction effect, which means that the mentoring program is less
effective for children that already experience relatively more intense interaction in
their families and is pronounced for children that experience fewer intense interac-
tions in their families. The same pattern is found when we look at the effects of lane
choice and the probability of failure, see table A7. This suggests that the mentoring
program provides resources that are scarce in low-SES family environments, namely
intense social interactions that allow children to have new experiences and obtain
feedback that sharpens their sense of their strengths and weaknesses.
15
Gained stars (# 0-7)
(1) (2)




Treatment x intense interaction -0.460**
(0.227)
Sample: Control low SES T & C low SES
Observations 309 485
Table 5: Coefficients are inverse probability weighted (IPW) Tobit estimates, standard errors in
brackets. All regressions also include a constant, age, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling),
interviewer FEs, marble ability FEs and standardized willingness to take risk. IPWs account for
potential selective attrition and are estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection
indicator (indicating whether the self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave)
regressed on baseline measures of self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and high
SES dummies and the interaction of baseline measures and the group dummies. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduced a novel tool to measure the accuracy of self-assessment
among children. We employed this tool to study the role of the social environment in
shaping the accuracy of self-assessment. We showed that: (i) children from high-SES
families are more accurate in their self-assessments compared to children from low-
SES families; (ii) an exogenous enrichment of the social environment via a mentoring
program has a causal positive effect on low-SES children’s self-assessments; (iii) the
mentoring program is most effective for children whose parents provide fewer social
and interactive activities for their children.
The skill to accurately assess one’s strengths and weaknesses is arguably a key
determinant of good decision-making in many contexts of economic relevance, e.g.,
educational or career choices. The literature on the development of metacognition
posits that metacognition and related skills are malleable and shaped by feedback
and experiences. Our results bolster this view and provide causal evidence for the
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Sample: all children Gained stars (# 0-7)
(1) (2) (3)
Age (in years) 0.532** 0.497** 0.410*
(0.232) (0.232) (0.227)
Controlling for ability no yes yes
Controlling for risk pref. no no yes
Observations 596 596 596
Table A1: Coefficients are inverse probability weighted (IPW) Tobit estimates, standard errors in
brackets. All regressions also include a constant, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling) and
interviewer FEs. Marble ability is the performance in the trial round. Willingness to take risk is
the number of risky choices (lottery over save amount). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
Sample: Low SES T & C Gained stars (# 0-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base: Low SES Control
Treatment dummy 0.557** 0.611** 0.518* 0.629**
(0.279) (0.278) (0.276) (0.285)
Marble ability FEs no yes no no
Age & gender no no yes no
Interviewer FEs no no no yes
Observations 485 485 485 485
Table A2: Coefficients are inverse probability weighted (IPW) Tobit estimates, standard errors
in brackets. All regressions also include a constant and location fixed effects as treatment prob-
abilities differ by location (see sampling). IPWs account for potential selective attrition and are
estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection indicator (indicating whether the
self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave) regressed on baseline measures
of self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and high SES dummies and the inter-
action of baseline measures and the group dummies. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
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Poisson regressions Gained stars (# 0-7)
Sample: Low SES T & C (1) (2) (3)
Base: Low SES Control
Treatment dummy 0.440** 0.436** 0.413*
(0.192) (0.213) (0.211)
Inverse probability weighting no yes yes
Willingness to take risk no no yes
Observations 485 485 485
Table A3: Coefficients are average marginal effects after Poisson regressions, standard errors in
brackets. All regressions also include a constant, age, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling),
interviewer FEs and marble ability FEs. Marble ability is the performance in the trial round.
Willingness to take risk is the number of risky choices (lottery over save amount). IPWs account for
potential selective attrition and are estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection
indicator (indicating whether the self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave)
regressed on baseline measures of self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and high
SES dummies and the interaction of baseline measures and the group dummies. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
OLS regressions Gained stars (# 0-7)
Sample: Low SES T & C (1) (2) (3)
Base: Low SES Control
Treatment dummy 0.435** 0.429** 0.419*
(0.219) (0.217) (0.214)
Inverse probability weighting no yes yes
Willingness to take risk no no yes
Observations 485 485 485
Table A4: Coefficients are OLS estimates, standard errors in brackets. All regressions also include
a constant, age, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling), interviewer FEs and marble ability
FEs. Marble ability is the performance in the trial round. Willingness to take risk is the number
of risky choices (lottery over save amount). IPWs account for potential selective attrition and are
estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection indicator (indicating whether the
self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave) regressed on baseline measures of
self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and high SES dummies and the interaction
of baseline measures and the group dummies. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
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Marble ability Willingness to take risk
(standardized) (standardized)
Sample: Low SES T & C (1) (2)
Treatment dummy 0.016 -0.024
(0.099) (0.102)
Observations 485 485
Table A5: No treatment effects on marble ability and risk preferences. Coefficients are inverse
probability weighted (IPW) OLS estimates, standard errors in brackets. Marble ability is the
number of scores in the trial round. Willingness to take risk is the number of risky choices (lottery
over save amount). All regressions also include a constant, location and interviewer fixed effects.
IPWs account for potential selective attrition and are estimated from a linear probability model
of a binary selection indicator (indicating whether the self-assessment measure is available for
the post-treatment wave) regressed on baseline measures of self-assessment, social interaction and
ability, treatment and high SES dummies and the interaction of baseline measures and the group
dummies. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Sample: Low SES T & C Gained stars (# 0-7)
(1) (2)
Base: Low SES Control
Treatment dummy 0.713* 0.743*
(0.369) (0.390)
Regarded sub-sample: Zero risky choice At least one risky choice
Observations 156 329
Table A6: Coefficients are inverse probability weighted (IPW) Tobit estimates, standard errors
in brackets. Column 1 regards the sub-sample of children who did not make any risky choice in
the coin toss experiment. Column 2 regards the sub-sample of children who did make at least
one risky choice in the coin toss experiment. All regressions also include a constant, age, gender,
location fixed effects (see sampling), interviewer FEs and marble ability FEs. Marble ability is
the performance in the trial round. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Chosen lane (# 1-7) Failure (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intense interaction -0.067 -0.045 -0.057** -0.054**
(baseline, std.) (0.064) (0.062) (0.024) (0.024)
Treatment dummy -0.316*** -0.122***
(0.115) (0.043)










Observations 307 483 309 485
Table A7: Coefficients are inverse probability weighted (IPW) OLS estimates, standard errors in
brackets. All regressions also include a constant, age, gender, location fixed effects (see sampling),
interviewer FEs, marble ability FEs and standardized willingness to take risk. IPWs account for
potential selective attrition and are estimated from a linear probability model of a binary selection
indicator (indicating whether the self-assessment measure is available for the post-treatment wave)
regressed on baseline measures of self-assessment, social interaction and ability, treatment and high
SES dummies and the interaction of baseline measures and the group dummies. In columns 1 and
2 two observations are missing due to experimenter misreporting. ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure A1: Flow chart of sampling and procedural details.
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Figure A2: The marble lanes
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B Translated Version of Instructions
1st round
Rules of the game
“Look, here I have a marble lane. At the end there is a squared hole. That is where
you are supposed to get the marble in. You have to stay here at this end of the lane
and are not allowed to touch the lane while rolling your marble. If the marble does
not stay in the hole, we cannot count it as a success. You can now try ten times.
Just see how often you can hit the hole out of these ten times.”
Results
The child scored times (0-10).
2nd round
“That worked out fine. Please come over here. Here are seven more marble lanes
with round holes which have different sizes.
You can now win stars with your marbles. However, you can only win stars if at
least five of your ten marbles drop into the hole. So, only if you either score 5, 6,
7, 8, 9 or 10 times. If you score less than five times (which means 4, 3, 2 or 1 time
or never), you won’t get any stars.
All marble lanes have different levels of difficulty. That is why you can win different
amounts of stars playing on them. On the easiest lane with the biggest hole you can
win one star; on the hardest lane with the smallest hole you can win seven stars.
How many stars you can win on each lane is written on the lanes themselves. On
this lane one star, here two, here three, here four, here five, here six and here seven.”
→ Point to the lanes while stating the amounts of stars.
“But remember: You will only win stars at all if you score at least five out of ten
times!
You can now pick one of the seven lanes on which you would like to play. Think
carefully about your choice. Okay, now we try to recapitulate the rules together.”
Testing how well the rules were understood
→ Pick the two-stars lane!
“Please tell me, if three of your marbles drop into this lane’s hole, how many stars
will you get?”
Correct answer: 0
Answer to “Three-marbles question” correct 
26
Answer to “Three-marbles question” false 
“And if eight of your marbles drop into this lane’s hole, how many stars will you
get?”
Correct answer: 2
Answer to “Eight-marbles question” correct 
Answer to “Eight-marbles question” false 
→ Pick the five-stars lane!
“Please tell me, if four of your marbles drop into this lane’s hole, how many stars
will you get?”
Correct answer: 0
Answer to “Four-marbles question” correct 
Answer to “Four-marbles question” false 
“And if six of your marbles drop into this lane’s hole, how many stars will you get?”
Correct answer: 5
Answer to “Six-marbles question” correct 
Answer to “Six-marbles question” false 
→ If the child does not understand the rules of the game, thus if it doesn’t answer
the control questions correctly, please briefly repeat the rules and pose a new control
question. If the answer is wrong again, repeat again. Repeat the rules at most three
times. If the child does not grasp the rules at all, play the game anyhow to avoid
disappointing the child, except for the case that the child is so frustrated that it
does not want to play the game.
The child has understood the rules of the game at once. 
The child has understood the rules of the game after (1, 2 or 3) repetitions. 
The child has not understood the rules after three repetitions. 
“Well done, you have understood the game very well. So please decide now on which
marble lane you would like to play.”
Results
Time until the decision was made: seconds [Start measuring time at the end of
the phrase.]
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The child has decided to play on lane (1-7).
The child scored times (0-10). [In any case let the child play all ten rounds.]
→ If the child scored at least 5 times:
Hand out the stars; put them into a NEW bag labeled with the child’s name and
put the bag next to the table close to the child.
“That was great. You have scored [#score] times at the [ ]-stars lane, therefore you
get [ ] stars.”
→ If the child scored less than 5 times:
“Unfortunately, less than five of your marbles have dropped into the hole, hence you
won’t get any stars. But never mind, later on you can win more stars.”
Remarks:
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